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INSIDER THREAT: THE UNSEEN DANGERS POSED BY




Security breaches involving badged airport employees1 are a
growing risk in today’s commercial aviation industry. Currently,
at almost every commercial airport in the United States, employ-
ees of airports, airlines, purveyors, and other tenants enjoy un-
fettered access to the airport’s Security Identification Display
Area (SIDA), sterile, and secured areas. In recent years, there
have been several high profile incidents deriving from this free-
dom of movement and lack of oversight which have resulted in
the introduction of dangerous contraband into the aviation
system.
Several alternatives can be implemented to combat this prob-
lem. What is perhaps the most effective of these is also the most
expensive: promulgating regulations that require 100 percent
screening of all airport employees entering the SIDA. Other
proposals include increasing background investigations into air-
port badgeholders, increasing penalties for violations of airport
security rules as a means of preventing at-risk employees from
* Pete Greco is a Spring 2017 graduate of the Antonin Scalia Law School at
George Mason University in Arlington, Virginia. Currently, he works as an
associate at Kirstein & Young, PLLC, an aviation law firm in Washington, D.C.
Prior to attending law school, Mr. Greco earned a Bachelor of Science degree in
Aviation Business Administration from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in
Daytona Beach, Florida and worked as an Airfield Operations Specialist at
Orlando International Airport in Orlando, Florida. Mr. Greco is an FAA-certified
private pilot with instrument rating and is licensed to practice law in the State of
Florida.
1 It is important to note that, for the purposes of this analysis, “airport employ-
ees” refers not just to the employees who work for the airport operator itself but
to any employee that works at a given airport and holds an airport identification
badge from that airport.
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ever obtaining a SIDA badge, or deterring such badgeholders
from misusing their access media.
Risks involving airport badgeholders grow more prevalent by
the day. Immediate change and rulemaking is needed if our
commercial aviation system is to remain as safe and secure as it
is today.
II. BACKGROUND
To properly understand this subject, a brief history of airport
security regulation is required. In the early years of commercial
aviation, airport security was almost entirely non-existent.2 Pas-
sengers could walk straight from the curb to their aircraft with-
out passing through any sort of inspection station, and today’s
concept of a so-called “sterile” area—the area beyond the secur-
ity-screening checkpoint—had not yet been created.3 As a result,
even non-ticketed persons could walk onto any aircraft parked
at the gate, into the gate area itself, and—due to the lack of
screening—carry with them virtually anything.4 Naturally, be-
cause airline passengers were unrestricted as far as security was
concerned, airport employee security concerns were irrelevant:
no one was inspected unless they exhibited suspicious behavior;
thus, there was no risk of an employee using their access privi-
leges to circumvent such inspection.5
Then, between 1968 and 1972, the number of hijackings of
commercial air carrier flights increased sharply.6 These hijack-
ings were largely nonviolent, with hijackers generally requesting
the aircraft be rerouted to Cuba before some sort of peaceful
conclusion to the incident was reached.7 However, these inci-
dents drew attention to the security concerns facing commercial
aviation and, on January 5, 1973, the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA)—as the federal regulatory agency governing avia-
tion—promulgated 14 C.F.R. § 107, for the first time laying out
2 Bryan Gardiner, Off with Your Shoes: A Brief History of Airport Security, WIRED
(June 14, 2013, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/06/fa_planehijackings
[http://perma.cc/9L5N-B58J].




5 Gardiner, supra note 2.
6 Id.
7 Brendan I. Koerner, How Hijackers Commandeered Over 130 American Planes – in
5 Years, WIRED (June 18, 2013, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/06/love-
and-terror-in-the-golden-age-of-hijacking/ [http://perma.cc/SJ6Y-XVVY].
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detailed and specific requirements for aviation security.8 Part
107 contained requirements for airport operators insofar as
mandating some degree of background checks on employees
and the installation of access control devices at airports.9 It also
required that all airlines hire private security contractors to
screen every departing passengers, as the government did not
yet serve this function.10 However, these security measures con-
tained many deficiencies and presented many opportunities for
exploitation, as will be explored further infra.
Airport security regulation remained relatively stagnant until
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Immediately thereaf-
ter, on November 19, 2001, the Aviation and Transportation Se-
curity Act was passed,11 creating the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) and shifting responsibility for aviation se-
curity away from the FAA.12 Originally, this agency operated
under the Department of Transportation until it was transferred
to the Department of Homeland Security in 2003.13 Unlike
under the FAA’s Part 107, TSA employees themselves—with the
exception of a number of airports who have opted to supply
their own screeners—handle the majority of passenger screen-
ing operations.14 Additionally, the requirements set forth under
the TSA’s 49 C.F.R. § 1540 and § 1542 are substantially stricter
than all prior precedent: (1) the “sterile” area post-security
screening was created and limited to only ticketed passengers;
(2) the SIDA—or the non-public areas of an airport where dis-
play of an airport ID badge is compulsory—was created; the so-
called “3-1-1 rule” was created; (3) enhanced x-rays and millime-
ter-wave detection systems began to be utilized; and (4) permit-
ted items onboard aircraft were substantially reduced, to name
just a few examples.15
8 Theresa L. Kraus, The Federal Aviation Administration: A Historical Perspective,
1903–2008, at 48–49 (U.S. Dep’t of Transp. 2008), https://www.faa.gov/about/
history/historical_perspective/media/historical_perspective_ch4.pdf (Chapter 4:
New Challenges – New Duties) [http://perma.cc/CEC9-5X6L].
9 14 C.F.R. § 107 (2016).
10 Id.
11 Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 101, 115
Stat. 597 (2001).
12 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2012).
13 Transportation Security Administration, FEDERAL REGISTER, https://www.federal
register.gov/agencies/transportation-security-administration [https://perma.cc/
P6AX-LTMF].
14 49 U.S.C. § 40101.110(b).
15 49 C.F.R. §§ 1540.105, 1540.107, 1540.111, 1542.103 (2016).
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Under the current regulatory framework, each and every com-
mercial airport certificated by the FAA under 14 C.F.R. § 139
must also comply with the provisions of Part 1542.16 Part 1542
lays out a number of requirements that airports must meet in
order to serve commercial air carrier operations. Paramount to
these is the requirement to create, maintain, and follow a TSA-
approved Airport Security Program (ASP) which lays out in
great detail how the airport will comply with each of the require-
ments of Part 1542.17 Airports are also required to appoint an
Airport Security Coordinator who is charged with enforcing Part
1540, Part 1542, and the ASP on all airport users.18
Airports are also required to: (1) create a unique, color-coded
badging system that limits airport access based upon employ-
ment needs; (2) designate areas of the airport as the SIDA, ster-
ile, and secured areas; train employees on security policies and
practices; (3) maintain a CCTV system; (4) conduct random au-
dits and testing; and (5) facilitate background investigations on
SIDA badge applicants.19 In doing such background investiga-
tions, airport operators must conduct both TSA-administered
Security Threat Assessments as well as FBI-administered Crimi-
nal History Records Checks (CHRC).20 If a SIDA badge appli-
cant has committed one or more of the TSA-designated twenty-
seven disqualifying offenses, the applicant is ineligible to receive
a SIDA badge.21
Badged employees may use their access cards to bypass the
TSA passenger checkpoint; however, they must submit to
screening at that checkpoint should they choose to report to
work through the main sterile area entrance.22 Additionally, air-
ports deploy a wide range of access control technologies, rang-
ing from a numeric keypad with a personal identification
number (PIN), all the way to biometric security systems.23
Badgeholders flying out of the airport on commercial flights
must submit to normal passenger screening.24 Airport ID badges
16 Id. §§ 1542.3, 1542.101 (2016).
17 Id. § 1542.103 (2016).
18 Id. § 1542.3 (2016); see also Telephone Interview with Justin T. Grindell,
A.C.E., K-9 Handler, Greater Orlando Aviation Authority (Nov. 29, 2016) [here-
inafter Telephone Interview with Justin T. Grindell] (on file with author).






2017] INSIDER THREAT 721
can be deactivated remotely at any time in the event of a lost or
stolen card, repeat security violations, or a disgruntled former
employee who has declined to return his or her ID badge.25 Vio-
lations of local airport security policies or federal security regu-
lations carry a range of penalties, ranging from a temporary
badge suspension or a small fine payable to the local airport
operator to civil penalties assessed by the TSA or criminal penal-
ties including jail time and a substantial fine.26
Having presented a background on the state of airport secur-
ity in general, it is now possible to detail the security concerns
that exist with airport and airline employees (or badgeholders).
The most prudent means of accomplishing this is by analyzing
the highest profile and most serious incidents that have oc-
curred as a result of a badgeholder misusing his or her access
privileges in some way.
One of the earliest of these such incidents occurred just over
ten years following the FAA’s promulgation of Part 107.27 It in-
volved PSA Airlines Flight 1771 on December 7, 1987. Flight
1771 was a scheduled flight from Los Angeles to San Francisco.28
It was operated by a British Aerospace BAe 146-200 and was car-
rying forty-three passengers and crewmembers.29 David Burke
was a disgruntled former employee of then-called USAir, the
parent company of PSA.30 He had recently been terminated by
USAir on allegations of stealing from the proceeds of in-flight
cocktail sales, but he had not surrendered his USAir employee
identification badge. Using this badge, Burke was able to smug-
gle a .44 Magnum revolver onto Flight 1771 undetected, and
when the aircraft was at cruising altitude, shot and killed both
pilots and several passengers, resulting in the aircraft crashing
and the deaths of all onboard.31
25 Id.
26 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 46314(b) (2011); 49 U.S.C. § 46301(a)(4) (2016).
27 Ed Magnunson, David Burke’s Deadly Revenge, TIME (June 24, 2001), http://
content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,145653,00.html.
28 Eric Malnic, Report Confirms That Gunman Caused 1987 Crash of PSA Jet, L.A.




31 Michael Taylor, PUBLIC SAFETY: Preventing Air Crime: Better Security Won’t
Stop Determined Terrorists, Experts Say U.S. Still Has Not Done Enough, SFGATE (Feb.
10, 2002, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/PUBLIC-SAFETY-Pre
venting-Air-Crime-Better-2874548.php [http://perma.cc/22MK-2D4Q].
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Seven years later, another high profile aviation incident in-
volving a disgruntled airline employee occurred. On April 7,
1994, Federal Express Flight 705, a McDonnell Douglas DC-10
aircraft on a scheduled flight from Memphis, Tennessee to San
Jose, California, was hijacked by Auburn Calloway, a FedEx
flight engineer who was facing termination for lying on his em-
ployment application about his total flight time.32 Calloway by-
passed security screening and accessed Flight 705 as a deadhead
passenger.33 In his guitar case, he carried several hammers and a
speargun.34 His plan was to disable the DC-10’s cockpit voice
recorder, kill the crewmembers with hammers to simulate inju-
ries consistent with an aircraft crash, and fly the aircraft into the
ground so that his family would be able to collect on a $2.5 mil-
lion life insurance policy provided by the company.35 However,
despite the horrific injuries inflicted upon them by Calloway,
crewmembers were able to subdue him and land the aircraft
safely.36
Fortunately, due to updated regulations promulgated as a re-
sult of these two incidents that require the full screening of all
employees traveling outbound on commercial flights as a pas-
senger, incidents as severe as these have not occurred again.
However, security issues involving airport badgeholders are still
very prevalent, and in recent years, incidents involving these in-
dividuals have been on the rise. These “new wave” breaches are
designed to be well disguised and are extremely different in na-
ture than the two discussed supra.
Perhaps the most notable of these modern employee security
breaches occurred between May and December 2014 at the Wil-
liam B. Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport (Atlanta
International Airport) in Atlanta, Georgia.37 Atlanta Interna-
tional Airport is the busiest airport in the world, and as such, a
major breach in security there is particularly troubling. Two
men, one a Delta Air Lines employee and the other a non-em-
ployee accomplice, worked together to smuggle over 153 guns
32 Penny Rafferty Hamilton, Life Changer – The Horrific Story of FedEx Flight 705,






37 Ashley Fantz et al., DA: Guns Smuggled on Planes in Atlanta an ‘Egregious’ Secur-
ity Breach, CNN (Dec. 30, 2014, 10:50 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/23/
us/delta-employee-gun-smuggling/index.html [http://perma.cc/HS29-RK6R].
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and ammunition on several commercial Delta Air Lines flights.38
Eugene Harvey, the Delta employee, used his SIDA badge to
bring the suitcase full of guns and ammunition around the se-
curity checkpoint and up to the sterile area, where his accom-
plice, Mark Quentin Henry, would meet him in the bathroom
after clearing the TSA passenger checkpoint.39 Henry would
then take the suitcase full of contraband from Harvey and board
flights bound for New York, which he did at least twenty times.40
Two assault rifles and 129 handguns were supplied altogether
using this technique.41 Several of the handguns were loaded
while being transported by Henry in the aircraft’s overhead
compartments.42
Prior to the Atlanta incident, in March 2007, now-defunct
Comair Airlines employee Zabdiel J. Santiago Balaguer used his
SIDA badge at Orlando International Airport in Orlando, Flor-
ida to smuggle guns and drugs aboard several Delta Air Lines
flights to Puerto Rico.43 Santiago Balaguer would bring the con-
traband with him through the airport’s unmonitored perimeter
gates and hand it off to his accomplices in the sterile area of the
airside terminals after they cleared the TSA security check-
point.44 Over fourteen weapons and twenty-eight pounds of ma-
rijuana were smuggled throughout the life of the operation.45 In
July 2007, yet another smuggling operation was uncovered at
Orlando International Airport when JetBlue Airways employee
Hiram Rivera-Ortiz used his SIDA badge in a similar fashion to
smuggle four pistols and two submachine guns onto flights to
Puerto Rico for a payment of $4,500.46
Just one month after the 2014 Atlanta incident was uncov-
ered, an FAA aviation safety inspector used his SIDA badge to






43 Airport to Screen Workers After Guns, Drugs Smuggled Onto Florida Flight, FOX




46 Henry P. Curtis, Orlando Airport’s Efforts Fail to Prevent Gun, Drug Smuggling,
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Jan. 28, 2008), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2008-01-
28/news/oiasecurity28_1_orlando-international-airport-puerto-rico-commercial-
airport [https://perma.cc/YZB2-DUX7].
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New York with a loaded handgun in his carry-on luggage.47 Ear-
lier in 2014, five airline employees at Boston’s General Edward
Lawrence Logan International Airport were charged with using
their SIDA badges to smuggle more than $400,000 in cash.48
Narcotics smuggling by airport badgeholders is another major
risk that has come to light in the past several years. Unlike gun
smuggling, which poses a direct threat to security, narcotics
smuggling is not by itself immediately dangerous. However, such
incidents must be taken seriously, for the means by which em-
ployees use their SIDA badges illegally to smuggle drugs are the
same means used to introduce dangerous items into the system
that can impact safety and security. In 2015, Southwest Airlines
employee Michael Videau was one of three baggage handlers at
Oakland International Airport in Oakland, California charged
with smuggling marijuana onto commercial flights in a fashion
similar to the 2014 Atlanta incident discussed supra.49 Videau
would bring the narcotics into the sterile area using his SIDA
badge to bypass the TSA checkpoint and then hand off the con-
traband to his accomplices after they cleared the security check-
point as passengers.50 In March 2016, JetBlue Airways flight
attendant Marsha Gay Reynolds attempted to use her airline em-
ployee ID at the Known Crewmember (KCM) checkpoint—a
TSA program that allows flight attendants and pilots to bypass
security screening unless randomly selected—to smuggle sixty-
eight pounds of cocaine onto a commercial flight.51 However,
Reynolds happened to be selected for random screening that
day at the KCM checkpoint and upon being informed of this,
took off running, leaving her bag filled with cocaine behind.52
She was arrested shortly thereafter.53
47 Scott Mayerowitz, TSA Increases Screening of Airport and Airline Employees, USA




49 Former Southwest Airlines Employee at Oakland Airport Pleads Guilty to Smuggling




51 Eliott C. McLaughlin & David Shortell, Feds: Flight Attendant Left 68 Pounds of
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Above and beyond issues involving badgeholders using their
SIDA badges in violation of airport security rules and federal
security regulations, in the past few years, several individuals
have been issued airport identification badges when they likely
should not have been due to some type of disqualification. For
instance, in 2016, a Freedom of Information Act request identi-
fied that seventy-three badged employees at forty different com-
mercial U.S. airports had been flagged for having ties to
terrorist groups.54 Moreover, in September 2014, a former
badged airline employee died in Syria fighting for ISIS.55
III. DISCUSSION
The risks pertaining to airport badgeholders either misusing
their privileges or slipping through the cracks of the vetting pro-
cess have been clearly demonstrated. As history has proven, dis-
astrous consequences may follow from abuse of the freedom
given to airport badgeholders. While the overall security of the
system today is significantly better than on September 11, 2001,
and before, it is clear that there is still a lot of work that must be
done in order to ensure that the security of commercial aviation
continues. Some potential modifications that can be made to
security regulations are simple, while others are extremely com-
plicated and complex for several reasons. There are four possi-
ble changes that can be made to the current system to rectify the
risks that still exist in the modern airport security system. These
alternatives are: (1) instituting 100 percent employee screening;
(2) a multi-layered and more thorough background check pro-
cess; (3) random Explosives Detection Canine Team (EDCT) K-
9 sweeps of non-public employee areas; and (4) supplemental
random employee screening on ramp areas near air carrier air-
craft. Each will be addressed in turn.
When analyzing any of the alternatives requiring employee
screening or additional employee screening, one threshold con-
sideration that must be made is constitutional concerns. Under
Amendment IV to the Bill of Rights in the U.S. Constitution,
individuals have the right “to be secure in their persons, houses,
54 2 Employees at Logan Airport Flagged for Potential Terrorism Ties, FOX (Mar. 15,
2016, 11:34 AM), http://www.fox25boston.com/news/2-employees-at-logan-air
port-flagged-for-potential-terrorism-ties/161897263 [http://perma.cc/2K2Q-V9
TR].
55 Amanda Vicinanzo, Major Gaps in Airport Employee Screening Threaten Home-
land Security, KATHLEEN RICE (Feb. 6, 2015), http://kathleenrice.house.gov/news
/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=29 [http://perma.cc/3KFH-8X5T].
726 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [82
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.”56
It is important to note at the outset that the Fourth Amend-
ment only applies to those searches and seizures conducted by
government employees or agents.57 What exactly constitutes
“state actors” for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment is a
notoriously confusing area of the law.58 Perhaps, however, for
the purposes of airport employee screening, the answer is less
obscure. Airports in the United States are owned either by the
federal government, the state government, or the local govern-
ment (city, town, or county). In many cases, instead of the gov-
ernment operating the facility themselves, they instead create
through legislation a quasi-governmental public corporation to
operate the facility, such as an airport authority or a port author-
ity.59 This is the case at airports such as Orlando International
Airport in Florida, owned by the City of Orlando but operated
by the Greater Orlando Aviation Authority (GOAA).60
Even still, some airport owners or airport authorities decline
to actually run the facility themselves and instead hire a wholly
private contractor to handle all aspects of the airport’s manage-
ment and operation. One example of this is at Albany Interna-
tional Airport in New York, owned by the City of Albany but
operated entirely by AFCO AvPorts, Inc.61 As an added wrinkle,
regardless of the governmental status of the airport itself and as
discussed infra, any supplemental employee screening opera-
tions would almost certainly be conducted by a private security
contractor instead of direct employees of the airport operator
itself.
Despite all of this confusion, for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment, it is actually quite straightforward. Several courts
56 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
57 See, e.g., United States v. Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d 929, 935 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
58 See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349–50 (1974).
59 See AvPorts Services: Comprehensive Airport Management, AVPORTS, http://av
ports.com/services/comprehensive-airport-management [http://perma.cc/7U4J
-GPPV] (last visited Oct. 18, 2017).
60 See About Us, ORLANDO INT’L AIRPORT MCO, https://orlandoairports.net/
about-us/ [http://perma.cc/9AP3-84P2] (last visited Oct. 18, 2017).
61 Albany International Airport, AVPORTS, http://avports.com/airport/albany-in
ternational-airport-alb [http://perma.cc/YB7U-Z38H] (last visited Oct. 18,
2017).
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have held that, for the purposes of determining the Fourth
Amendment’s “state action” requirement, the source of the
searcher’s paycheck is immaterial, and instead, the public or pri-
vate nature of the facility at which the search takes place must be
considered, including the source of the facility’s operating fund-
ing.62 As a result, it seems clear that, in relation to airport
badgeholder security screening, the individuals conducing that
screening—regardless of whether they are legally public or pri-
vate employees—must be considered “state actors” for the pur-
poses of a Fourth Amendment analysis.
That being said, in a situation where airport badgeholders are
required to submit to screening before reporting to work, while
working, or while sitting in their break areas, the privacy protec-
tions of the Fourth Amendment would be implicated. In the piv-
otal case of Katz v. United States,63 Justice Harlan’s concurring
opinion laid out the framework for determining if a search has
occurred.64 Specifically, Justice Harlan articulated a two-prong
test, stating that a search occurs only when government action
violates privacy that an individual has “exhibited an actual (sub-
jective) expectation of,” and when that expectation is one “that
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”65 Only if, by
that test, a search is found to have occurred, does an inquiry
into the existence of probable cause and the possession of a
search warrant need to be considered in assessing an alleged
Fourth Amendment violation.66 It has been well-established that
any person accessing an airport—indiscriminate of that individ-
ual’s purpose for being there—has a reasonable expectation of
privacy as to the items on their person or in their baggage.67 As a
result, at least facially, it would seem that the only way airport
screening would be possible is with probable cause and a search
warrant. However, as any passenger who has flown commercially
in the past several decades is aware, this is not the case.
As discussed supra, airport screening—at least from a passen-
ger perspective—has been in place since the early 1970s.68
62 See, e.g., Stroeber v. Comm’n Veteran’s Auditorium, 453 F. Supp. 926, 931
(S.D. Iowa 1977) (holding that private security officers “acting to provide security
for a public facility financed by public monies, [constitutes] ‘state action’”);
Tampa Sports Auth. v. Johnston, 914 So. 2d 1076, 1078 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
63 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
64 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 360–61.
67 See, e.g., United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1275–77 (5th Cir. 1973).
68 Gardiner, supra note 2.
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When passenger screening first came into existence, it was met
with constitutional challenges, namely on the grounds that a sus-
picionless search was being conducted without a warrant.69 How-
ever, in the wake of several high profile hijackings and threats,
courts quickly ruled that airport searches fall within the “admin-
istrative search” component of the “special needs” exception to
the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause and warrant require-
ment.70 Special needs searches are unique in that they are con-
ducted with no probable cause or suspicion of wrongdoing
whatsoever. As a result, their acceptability is determined using a
balancing test of reasonableness.71
Specifically, the Fifth Circuit held this requires courts to bal-
ance the public necessity, the efficacy of the search, and the de-
gree and nature of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment rights.72 The public necessity prong is easily satis-
fied by the serious threat of public injury and the high likeli-
hood of occurrence should no type of passenger screening be
conducted.73 The efficacy of the search is similarly satisfied by
the high likelihood the search will mitigate the potential
harm.74 The success rate of a traditional magnetometer satisfied
at least one court of the efficacy requirement,75 and modern
equipment used today, such as millimeter-wave detection sys-
tems, only increases the likelihood of detection. The degree and
nature of the intrusion caused by airport security screening is
mitigated largely by the fact that a hundred percent of passen-
gers are screened, eliminating any risk of embarrassment.76
69 See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 499 (2d Cir. 1974); Skipwith,
482 F.2d at 1276; Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230, 1232–33 (6th Cir. 1972).
70 See United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 958–59 (9th Cir. 2007) (“where the
risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches cali-
brated to the risk may rank as ‘reasonable’—for example, searches now routine
at airports and at entrances to courts and other official buildings”); United States
v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that airport screenings are
considered to be administrative searches because they are “conducted as part of a
general regulatory scheme” where the essential administrative purpose is “to pre-
vent the carrying of weapons or explosives aboard aircraft.”).
71 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (“Only in those excep-
tional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable,
is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers.”).
72 Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1275.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 804 (2d Cir. 1974).
76 See, e.g., Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F. Supp. 1134, 1146 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
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Moreover, the actual invasion of privacy is minimal as there is no
physical search unless the screening device alarms, at which
point reasonable suspicion is created for a Terry-style pat down.77
The Ninth Circuit framed the reasonableness standard of the
airport exception in slightly different terms, finding such
searches constitutionally permissible so long as the searches are
“no more extensive or intensive than necessary, in the light of
current technology, to detect weapons or explosives[,] . . . [are]
confined in good faith to that purpose[,]” and “passengers
[may] avoid the search by electing not to fly.”78 The technology
used today to screen passengers and luggage is designed to do
so with the smallest intrusion possible, and in keeping with the
requirement that such searches are confined to detecting weap-
ons and explosives, TSA personnel are decidedly not afforded
law enforcement powers.79 Further, as discussed in the following
paragraph, passengers are under no obligation to submit to TSA
screening: they may simply choose not to fly.
Outside the special needs exception, courts have similarly
ruled that, at least in some cases, airport security searches may
be permissible as consent searches.80 In these cases, courts have
reasoned that because flying is a choice and is not compulsory,
individuals impliedly consent to such searches when they arrive
at the security checkpoint in order to board their flight.81 Courts
have consistently ruled that, while for security reasons, once
screening has begun a passenger may not leave the checkpoint
until it is complete; this does not render the search
involuntary.82
It seems clear that searches of airport SIDA badgeholders, at
least to the extent that the Fourth Amendment is involved, are
77 Albarado, 495 F.2d at 806–07; United States v. Dalpiaz, 494 F.2d 374, 376–77
(6th Cir. 1974).
78 United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 961–62 (9th Cir. 2007).




80 See Dalpiaz, 494 F.2d at 376–77 (magnetometers and luggage searches are
constitutional as consensual if a person has the opportunity to avoid the search
by choosing not to fly).
81 See, e.g., United States v. Freeland, 562 F.2d 383, 385–86 (6th Cir. 1977) (a
luggage search is valid even as an implied consent search even though the defen-
dant was not advised that he could ask to have his luggage returned rather than
have it searched).
82 See, e.g., People v. Heimel, 812 P.2d 1177, 1181–82 (Colo. 1991).
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no different than those of airline passengers. As discussed infra,
searches of employees prior to entering the secured area or
SIDA are akin to searches of passengers accessing the sterile
area through the security checkpoint. In fact, many airport
badgeholders arrive to work through the main TSA checkpoint
and submit to the same screening the passengers receive. An
employee arriving through an employee-only access point would
be completely justified in departing the area prior to being
screened or not reporting to work at all. An employee’s “need”
to work is no more substantial than a passenger’s “need” to fly,
and as a result there is no material reason that such a search
should not be considered consensual.83 Consent becomes irrele-
vant once the employee enters the secured area, as TSA regula-
tions (under Part 1540.107) stipulate that all persons and
property are subject to search at any time within restricted
areas.84
Beyond clustering employee searches under the consent-
search category, searches of airport badgeholders logically fall
within the special needs exception category of searches as well.
Under case law such as Aukai85 and the balancing test laid out in
Skipwith,86 the public necessity of screening employees is just as
great if not greater than the public necessity of screening pas-
sengers. Employees with unfettered access to ramp areas and ve-
hicles can certainly inflict more damage to aircraft by loading
dangerous devices than can passengers who are restricted to
dangerous items that may fit inside their carry-on luggage. Fur-
thermore, the efficacy of the search would be identical to that
involving passengers at the TSA checkpoint as the same equip-
ment would necessarily need to be used for passengers and em-
ployees alike. Finally, because all employees would be screened
when arriving to work, the search would not be more intrusive
than the passenger searches at the TSA checkpoint. For employ-
ees randomly selected for supplemental screening on the ramps,
the provisions of Part 1540 discussed supra would similarly apply.
Moreover, one might argue that at least to the extent that dan-
gerous and deadly items might be smuggled onto the jobsite,
airline employees have a reduced expectation of privacy while at
83 See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224–30, 234 (1973) (hold-
ing that a search is consensual even if an individual feels they have no choice in
the matter).
84 49 C.F.R. § 1540.107 (2016).
85 United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007).
86 United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1275 (5th Cir. 1973).
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work compared to that of an average individual, similar to rail-
road employees.87 If this were true, even searches of
badgeholders arriving at work that are more intrusive than those
conducted on passengers could be justified.
Beyond constitutional issues, an additional legal considera-
tion is shared by all employee screening possibilities. That con-
sideration is equal employment, specifically relating to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The
EEOC is responsible for “enforcing federal laws that make it ille-
gal to discriminate against a job applicant or an employee be-
cause of the person’s race, color, religion, sex (including
pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national
origin, age (specifically forty years or older), disability or genetic
information.”88 Perhaps the most significant federal law under
the purview of the EEOC is the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits
discrimination based upon these so-called protected bases.89
While the EEOC might seem facially relevant to employee
screening, this potential legal conflict is easily resolved for three
main reasons.
First, the Civil Rights Act only relates to adverse employment
decisions or actions made on the grounds of one of the statute’s
listed protected bases, as reproduced above.90 Clearly, no such
employment action occurs in the context of employee security
screening, making the statute inapplicable. Second, the Civil
Rights Act applies only to actions taken by employers, defined by
the statute as “a person engaged in an industry affecting com-
merce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day
in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or pre-
ceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person.”91 It can-
not be disputed that the airport operator or its agents are not
the employers of the vast majority of those passing through the
checkpoints, meaning that, again, the statute is rendered inap-
plicable. Even if, arguendo, they were, the Civil Rights Act would
still not be implicated due to the following point—there is sim-
ply no discrimination being practiced in employee security
screenings. As discussed supra in the context of the Fourth
Amendment, each and every employee would be required to sub-
87 See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 627–28 (1989).
88 About EEOC, EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/
eeoc (last visited Oct. 18, 2017) [http://perma.cc/REL9-TLQ4].
89 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
90 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16a-b (2012); 42 U.S.C. 1983 (2012).
91 42 U.S.C. 2000 (2012).
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mit to screening before entering the SIDA and secured areas,
regardless of their gender, race, national origin, or any other fac-
tor. There would be no special selection practices or policies,
and screening would be the same for all employees. As a result,
it cannot validly be concluded that there would be any sort of
discrimination present that would violate the Civil Rights Act or
any other law under the jurisdiction of the EEOC.
With the constitutional and legal framework for the three al-
ternatives presented related to screening, each may be looked at
in specificity. The first of these alternatives is the introduction of
“100 percent-employee screening.”92 In essence, 100 percent
employee screening is where each and every SIDA badgeholder
at an airport is required to submit to an inspection of their per-
son and any personal belongings they may have with them every
time that employee enters the sterile area, secured area, or
SIDA. As discussed supra, the majority of commercial airports
today contain a system of doors, gates, and hallways where, using
their SIDA badge, employees can bypass the TSA security check-
point and enter into restricted areas with no screening whatso-
ever. In a 100 percent employee screening environment, a
security checkpoint is set up at each door or access point where
an employee can use his or her badge to transition from the
public areas to the SIDA or secured area, functionally equivalent
to a TSA passenger security checkpoint. Currently, only three
out of approximately 291 commercial airports in the United
States require any sort of employee screening: (1) Miami Inter-
national Airport; (2) Orlando International Airport; and (3) At-
lanta International Airport.93 And out of those three, only
Orlando International and Miami International require true
100 percent employee screening.94
To operationalize this term, it is useful to look at an example
of how the process works at a 100 percent employee screening
92 See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. OIG-09-05, TSA’S
SECURITY SCREENING PROCEDURES FOR EMPLOYEES AT ORLANDO INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT AND THE FEASIBILITY OF 100 PERCENT EMPLOYEE SCREENING at 2 (2008).
93 Few Airports Require Employee Screening Before Work, FOX NEWS (Apr. 11, 2016),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/04/11/few-airports-require-employee-
screening-before-work.amp.html [https://perma.cc/2XCV-AJCS].
94 Scott Zamost & Drew Griffin, Despite Security Gaps, No Full Screening for Airport
Workers, CNN (Apr. 21, 2015, 12:53 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/20/
travel/airport-workers-security-screening/index.html [http://perma.cc/Z598-
SL4V].
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facility, Orlando International Airport.95 Orlando is currently
the thirteenth busiest airport in the United States, serving ap-
proximately forty-two million passengers in the 2016 calendar
year.96 Design-wise, Orlando is somewhat unique among airports
because it follows a “landside-airside” layout. Unlike traditional
airports where the main terminal is physically connected to the
concourses that house the airline gates, at Orlando the two parts
of the terminal are separated by waterways and vegetation as
well at approximately one mile in distance. Orlando has one
main landside terminal and four airside terminals, each with ap-
proximately thirty gates. Passengers transfer from the main ter-
minal to the airside terminals using automated “people movers”
suspended as an above ground train (AGT). Two such trains ser-
vice each airside.
Below each airside’s AGT track runs a small vehicular roadway
leading into the main terminal. These roadways are used by air-
line tugs to tow inbound checked passenger luggage between
the aircraft and the baggage claim. Conversely, they are also
used to tow outbound checked passenger baggage from the TSA
baggage inspection equipment to the departing aircraft at the
airsides. Access control doors with employee security screening
checkpoints are located throughout the baggage claim areas
that provide access to this inbound and outbound baggage
processing area inside the main terminal building.
Due to the landside-airside layout of Orlando, many employ-
ees enter the SIDA not through the main terminal but through
exterior, remote employee screening checkpoints, each located
at one of the vehicle access gates. After employees are initially
screened, they must be screened again if they exit the SIDA and
later return.
A 100 percent employee screening setup has many positives
that make it a desirable option. For one, it is undoubtedly the
most effective of all the alternatives presented. In a true 100 per-
cent employee screening environment, there is simply no way
that an employee can abuse their SIDA badge to smuggle con-
95 The following specific information regarding Orlando International Airport
is based off of factual, non-privileged information the author gathered during his
employment as an Airfield Operations Specialist for the Greater Orlando Avia-
tion Authority from May 2013 to July 2014.
96 Press Release: Orlando International Airport Ends 2016 with Record Domes-
tic and International Traffic, Orlando Int’l Airport MCO (Feb. 10, 2017) [herein-
after Orlando Press Release], https://orlandoairports.net/press/2017/02/10/
orlando-international-airport-ends-2016-record-domestic-international-traffic/.
734 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [82
traband onto aircraft. The employee’s physical person, vehicle,
and carried belongings are thoroughly checked prior to being
permitted to enter the SIDA or secured area. Under these con-
ditions, it would be all but impossible for an incident like those
discussed supra to occur.
Of course, this type of arrangement also has several down-
sides. For one thing, 100 percent employee screening is expen-
sive to set up and operate. For instance, Orlando’s operation
cost approximately $5 million to outfit.97 This included purchas-
ing five mobile x-ray scanners totaling over $600,000.98 Besides
this up-front cost, over 150 contract security personnel needed
to be hired to fill a 24/7 schedule.99 Initially, TSA screeners con-
ducted both passenger and employee screening, but GOAA sub-
contractors took over employee screening operations shortly
thereafter.100 Additionally, federal funding is currently unavaila-
ble to aid airport operators in setting up and operating em-
ployee security checkpoints, meaning all funds must be taken
from the airport’s operating budget.101 Despite this fact how-
ever, there is no shortage of security contractors willing to con-
tract with airports to provide employee screening, and several
such contractors are Department of Homeland Security SAFETY
Act designees.102 From an economic perspective, this certifica-
tion results in a greater number of suppliers, ultimately tending
to drive the cost of such security services downward.
Another negative to 100 percent employee screening, as out-
lined in a TSA report on the topic, is that such screening “is
incapable of determining a person’s motivations, attitudes and
capabilities to cause harm, among other limitations. No single
measure can provide broad-spectrum protection against risks or
adversaries. Therefore, risk-based, multi-layered security offers
the greatest ability to mitigate risks through the application of
flexible and unpredictable measures to protect commercial avia-
tion.”103 In other words, even if 100 percent employee screening
were mandated nationwide, it would likely just be a matter of




101 Telephone Interview with Justin T. Grindell, supra note 18.
102 SAFETY Act: Approved Technologies, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., https://
www.safetyact.gov/jsp/award/samsApprovedAwards.do?action=searchApproved
AwardsPublic [http://perma.cc/8BZE-NT5G].
103 Zamost & Griffin, supra note 93.
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time until loopholes are found and exploited. Resultantly, at
least according to the TSA, the better tactic requires taking ac-
tion that focuses on the motivations behind employee breaches,
as opposed to catching such employees in the act. This alterna-
tive is discussed in more detail infra.
Moreover, requiring all employees to stop for security screen-
ing while performing their job functions clearly impacts produc-
tivity. For instance, if an employee rushing late-checked bags
from a remote baggage handling facility to a departing aircraft
gets held up in a line of other employees waiting for screening,
not only could that departing flight be delayed, but, numerically
speaking, that employee will also be able to make fewer runs
between the terminal and the baggage facility during his or her
shift than would be possible absent employee screening. Relat-
edly, the relationship between airports and airlines could poten-
tially become strained should an airport operator be interested
in voluntarily moving to 100 percent employee screening model,
but airlines oppose it due to productivity concerns. Ultimately,
in such a case, a cost-benefit analysis must be completed by all
interested parties to determine the best course of action.
Another alternative pertaining to employee screening involves
the random, supplemental screening of employees in the se-
cured area. This alternative can be implemented either in con-
junction with a 100 percent employee screening program or on
its own, at airports unable to facilitate the screening of every
employee at all times. Under this type of system, TSA or airport
operations personnel would patrol the terminal areas within the
SIDA and secured area, and randomly select airport employees
for on-the-spot screening. The selections would be based upon
an unpredictable and random logarithm, perhaps focusing each
day on different employers, different shifts, or otherwise. In
such a system, a magnetometer wand would be used to conduct
a quick sweep of an employee, with a pat down following any
alarm activation. In addition, any personal belongings of em-
ployees within the secured area would also be subject to
inspection.
The positives of such a system are similar to those of a 100
percent employee screening. Would-be employee wrongdoers
are more likely to be caught in the act if a crime similar to those
carried out in Atlanta and Orlando were attempted. Moreover,
random security checks increase deterrence as would-be offend-
ers are unsure when or if a screening will take place. This func-
tionally serves as a tier in a multi-layered security plan, the
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approach to airport security endorsed by the TSA.104 In addi-
tion, random screening reduces the ability for wrongdoers to
find gaps in the system; a fluid system is, by definition, ever-
changing, meaning there are no routine patterns. A final posi-
tive of randomized employee screening is that from a legal
standpoint, 100 percent employee screening and random em-
ployee screening are effectively indistinguishable. To be sure,
randomized screening would also clearly meet the constitutional
reasonableness standards set out in cases discussed supra, such
as Aukai,105 and to the extent that EEOC issues are implicated,
such a system would not violate statutes such as the Civil Rights
Act, as the screening would not be conducted by employers or
in a discriminatory fashion. Instead, the randomized screening,
as mentioned, would follow an automated logarithmic
sequence.
The negatives to a randomized employee security screening
system are also similar to those of 100 percent employee screen-
ing. A marked decline in productivity would likely occur during
an employee’s shift, albeit a smaller one than in a 100 percent
screening environment. Additionally, costs would increase for
airport operators because of the necessity of hiring extra em-
ployees to execute the random screening policy. Finally, as with
any random security screening policy, there might also be claims
of discrimination insofar as certain races or ethnicities being sin-
gled out for random screening.
The final alternative solution involving the screening of em-
ployees involves utilizing Explosive Detective Canine Team
(EDCT K-9) units to conduct periodic and random sweeps of
restricted, employee-only areas such as breakrooms, internal
hallways, and locker rooms. Most large, commercial airports like
Orlando, Miami, and Atlanta have either their own on-site K-9
teams or a TSA K-9 team dedicated exclusively to the airport. In
this alternative, these EDCT K-9 teams would randomly walk
through employee-only areas—not just the SIDA and secured
areas but also leased tenant spaces within these areas—con-
ducing free air sniffs of employees and their personal belong-
ings for explosives.
104 Statement of Transp. Sec. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Before H.
Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t. Reform (May 13, 2015), https://oversight
.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/TSA-Statement.pdf [http://perma.cc
/GES6-SHLB].
105 United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir. 2007).
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It is well-settled law that these so-called free air sniffs do not
constitute searches for Fourth Amendment purposes, as individ-
uals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the air
around them in public places.106 As a result, the Fourth Amend-
ment need not be considered in this type of operation. Further,
the office spaces and employee break rooms located on the
ground level of airport terminal buildings are functionally “pub-
lic” in nature, despite the flying public’s restriction from acces-
sing them, for anyone with an airport ID badge may access those
areas, and ultimately, the space is owned by the airport opera-
tor. Beyond this, most commercial lease contracts allow the
landlord—in this case, the airport operator—to enter the leased
area to conduct periodic inspections.107 Lastly, because TSA reg-
ulations authorize the search of employees and their personal
effects any time they are within the SIDA, and because the free
air sniffs would focus entirely on those two things, Fourth
Amendment considerations would not be implicated under per
the special needs administrative search doctrine discussed in de-
tail supra.108 In the SIDA, no location is truly “private.”
There are many positives to a K-9 sweep program. First, K-9s
are substantially more effective than humans at detecting explo-
sives.109 As a result, an airport security employee using a K-9 unit
can, with impressive reliability, search an entire room in a frac-
tion of the time it would take a human to perform the same
task.110 Additionally, due to the sensitivity of K-9 noses, explo-
sives hidden deep from view—even inside walls or under floor-
ing—could be detected.111 Second, using K-9s for random
sweeps shares the benefits of random searches in general as dis-
cussed supra, in that a would-be wrongdoer would have no way
of knowing if and when such a sweep would occur and would be
unable to exploit a repetitive hole observed in the system. Third,
106 See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (“exposure of re-
spondent’s luggage, which was located in a public place, to a trained canine—did
not constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”).
107 Janet Portman, Landlord Rights to Enter Tenant’s Commercial Rental Space,
NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/clb-landlord-rights-enter-com
mercial-space.html [http://perma.cc/R9NE-43ZK].
108 See Aukai, 497 F.3d 955.
109 Susan L. Nasr, How Bomb-Sniffing Dogs Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://sci
ence.howstuffworks.com/bomb-sniffing-dog1.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2017).
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using K-9s instead of humans, while likely more expensive up
front, presents a cost savings over time as the amount of work
one K-9 can do in a day is equivalent to at least that of several
humans. In fact, EDCT K-9 teams at airports are fully funded by
TSA, meaning that airport operators themselves would feel no
impact from the addition of such teams.112 Lastly, many employ-
ees would likely find K-9 screenings less intrusive than magne-
tometer screenings or pat-downs, potentially increasing
employee morale.
As with every alternative, there are also several negatives, al-
though few in comparison. One negative could be a feeling of
distrust by badgeholders of the airport operator for coming into
their workspace and running K-9s. An additional negative is the
risk of false positives and other reliability issues with the K-9s
themselves. K-9s have limitations, and unless directed specifi-
cally to a bag or an individual, some K-9 units might have
trouble detecting odor. A final negative with this system is that it
does not work well, or at all, unless combined with another
means of employee screening: conducting random sweeps of
employee work areas does not guarantee that all contraband po-
tentially carried into the SIDA by employees will be detected.
Certainly, if an employee is able to bring something into the
SIDA because he or she was not screened during entry, there
would be other places for that employee to store the contraband
besides in their office space—perhaps even directly on an
aircraft.
Outside the realm of alternatives pertaining to employee
screening, one final alternative directly impacts airport em-
ployee security concerns: a multi-layered and more thorough
employee background check process. As discussed supra, prior
to receiving a SIDA badges, employees must be investigated.113
Currently, this constitutes a badge application requiring a mod-
est amount of background information, a CHRC, and a security
threat assessment.114 Recently, following the smuggling opera-
tion uncovered at Atlanta, TSA modified their policies to re-
quire a CHRC every two years and to conduct random, “real
time,” security assessments of badged employees.115 Yet, more is
112 Telephone Interview with Justin T. Grindell, supra note 18.
113 49 C.F.R. § 1544.229 (2016).
114 Id.
115 Melvin Carraway, TSA’s Efforts in Enhancing Airport Access Control, TRANSP.
SEC. ADMIN. (Apr. 30, 2015) https://www.tsa.gov/news/testimony/2015/04/30/
tsas-efforts-enhancing-airport-access-control [https://perma.cc/2QMM-9RYA].
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still needed: specifically, a more thorough badge application,
combined with interviews of the SIDA badge applicant and sev-
eral of his or her references. While the current system is effec-
tive at detecting potential threats to the system by prohibiting
those who have committed relevant crimes from obtaining a
badge and comparing applicant’s names to the various watch
lists, the current system is single-layered and not comprehensive.
That is, the current system fails to investigate employees beyond
what is on paper, as it declines to look into the employee’s per-
sonality, ties, and mentality. For a system to be truly multi-
layered, both types of investigations are required.
The positives of this type of investigative policy are largely self-
evident. The ability to interview an applicant and several refer-
ences would allow for background investigators to determine if
an individual poses a risk despite a paper-based approval. In es-
sence, such a practice would allow an employee’s application an-
swers to be corroborated face-to-face. In theory, even if someone
is cleared based upon their electronic background checks, that
person still might not pass the interview phase, similar to the
process of obtaining a government security clearance. A smaller,
secondary benefit is the deterrence that an interview policy
would have on would-be wrongdoers. Finally, because the back-
ground checks and interviews would be conducted by TSA and
run against every applicant in the same way, no EEOC-related
issues would arise.
Despite its benefits, a policy of conducting interviews for each
and every employee based on thorough application questions
has one major negative: it would be extremely cumbersome and
costly. Some airports employ upwards of 18,000
badgeholders,116 and to conduct a number of interviews for
each would be a massive undertaking, likely requiring the hiring
of many employees to assist in its execution. This issue could be
somewhat mitigated by correlating the level of interviewing for
each employee with their SIDA badge’s level of access: restau-
rant employees who do not have access to the secured area, for
instance, would not require as much personal background
checking as an airline ramp agent with direct access to aircraft.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
With a comprehensive analysis of four possible alternatives
that may be undertaken by airport operators and the TSA to
116 See Orlando Press Release, supra note 95.
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mitigate risks posed by SIDA badgeholders complete, it is now
possible to recommend one of these options. While it seems that
the positives of each of the four presented alternatives out-
weighed their negatives, all but one of the alternatives are not
self-sufficient. That is, only one of the alternatives—standing
alone and without any additional measures being taken in con-
junction—would likely have the most significant impact on the
risk. That alternative is the 100 percent employee security
screening model, and therefore is the recommended policy
change.
The rationale behind this recommendation embodies many
of the positives discussed supra. A 100 percent employee security
screening provides an exhaustive approach to mitigating the
carriage of contraband by employees into the SIDA, secured
area, and sterile area. Each employee, each time he or she en-
ters one of these areas, must submit to a full search of his or her
person and personal belongings. In so doing, airport operators
reduce, to a high degree of certainty, the possibility that an em-
ployee carries something nefarious with them. This type of sys-
tem is relatively easy to set up and to maintain and requires little
transition time or training. As discussed supra, Orlando Interna-
tional Airport set up its program in just a few weeks. Theoreti-
cally, in a 100 percent employee screening facility, every person
in the SIDA has been screened. Thus, unlike the majority of air-
ports in the United States where only the passenger boarding
areas are sterile, at 100 percent employee screening airports, the
entire facility is sterile, with the exception, of course, of work tools
that employees are permitted to carry with them.
Critics to this model often claim that such screening does not
actually reduce the possibility of a security breach from occur-
ring because it becomes predictable to employees arriving to
work each day.117 While this argument has some merit, it is im-
portant to remember that 100 percent employee screening
would become another layer to the wedding cake of airport se-
curity and would not exist independently. Any amount of pre-
dictability that might create the potential for exploitation would
be overcome by the multitude of currently-existing security pro-
cedures that are both in place and continue to be added. Un-
117 Cindy Drukier, TSA Won’t Be Screening All Airport Employees Despite Insider
Threats, EPOCH TIMES (Apr. 21, 2015, 2:40 PM), http://www.theepochtimes.com/
n3/1328514-tsa-wont-be-screening-all-airport-employees-despite-insider-threats/
[http://perma.cc/FG5S-3YNZ].
2017] INSIDER THREAT 741
derneath the 100 percent employee screening layer lie several
additional layers of security procedures to bridge the gap. 100
percent employee screening would simply ensure that everyone
accessing the airport’s most sensitive areas are screened, while
preserving other TSA programs that currently serve a similar
purpose.
Critics also state that a 100 percent employee screening
model is prohibitively expensive and, therefore, not practical as
a TSA mandate.118 However, the security of the civil aviation sys-
tem is not something a price tag should be placed upon, espe-
cially after weighing how much is at risk against how effective a
100 percent screening can be. Surely, funding can be derived
from a multitude of sources, budgets can be adjusted, and other
cost-cutting measures can be taken in less critical areas of an
airport to compensate for the added expense. Moreover, TSA
could institute a federal funding program for airports to get an
employee screening system running and staffed, much like the
FAA has done in grant programs such as the Airport Improve-
ment Program.119 The FAA could also collaborate with the TSA
to extend the permissible uses of Passenger Facility Charges—
up to $4.50 in fees that the FAA authorizes airport operators to
collect from each passenger’s ticket to cover various airport op-
erating expenses120—to include covering cost of the 100 percent
employee screening program, or TSA could simply come up
with its own similar program, passing a nominal airport security
fee on to passengers. Finally, and as a last resort, TSA could pro-
mulgate regulations only requiring Category X airports—the
highest of TSA’s classification of airports by passenger vol-
ume121—to institute 100 percent employee screening policies
and require lower-classified airports to institute some of the
other and less expensive alternatives that have been discussed
supra. Doing this would ensure that the nation’s most attractive
target airports—all of which necessarily have the funds to fi-
nance a 100 percent employee screening operation—are given
118 Id.
119 Airport Improvement Program: Overview, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.
faa.gov/airports/aip/overview [http://perma.cc/3SVQ-J5KQ] (last visited Oct.
18, 2017).
120 Airports: Passenger Facility Charges, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.
gov/airports/pfc [http://perma.cc/GR8R-Z3NF] (last visited Oct. 18, 2017).
121 TSA Reveals High-Security Category X Airports, AVIATION WK. (Oct. 10, 2002),
http://aviationweek.com/awin/tsa-reveals-high-security-category-x-airports
[https://perma.cc/7C89-XJ2A].
742 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [82
the highest level of employee security procedures possible, while
less busy airports still implement additional employee security
measures, but to a degree more proportional to their traffic
volumes.
Because the 100 percent employee screening model is exhaus-
tive, constitutional, legal, effective, independent, and necessary,
it is the recommended and best alternative to combat the grow-
ing problem of security breaches, threats, and risks involving air-
port SIDA badge-holding employees.
